Oman and Iran Chart a Course Through the Hormuz Strait

For the first time in years, Iranian and Omani officials are speaking openly about shared stewardship of the Strait of Hormuz. The narrow passage, through which roughly 21 million barrels of oil flow daily, has long been treated as Tehran’s exclusive security domain. That posture is quietly shifting.

The view from Muscat

Oman has positioned itself as the region’s discreet mediator for decades. Sultan Haitham bin Tariq’s government sees formal cooperation with Iran not as alignment but as insurance. By anchoring any future arrangement in bilateral terms rather than multilateral pacts dominated by larger powers, Muscat hopes to prevent Hormuz from becoming another arena for Saudi-Iranian rivalry or US military escalation. Omani diplomats have repeatedly told Western counterparts that stability in the strait cannot rest on the presence of foreign fleets alone.

Tehran’s recalibration

Iran’s interest is more layered. Years of sanctions have eroded its naval capacity to interdict shipping at will, while the memory of the 2019 tanker attacks lingers. A deal with Oman offers Tehran a way to project responsibility without surrendering its claim to primacy. Iranian state media frame the talks as recognition of Tehran’s “natural role,” yet the very act of negotiating with a smaller neighbour signals pragmatism. The Financial Times reports the two sides are edging toward a memorandum that would include joint patrols and environmental protocols, measures that stop short of formal demilitarisation but go beyond mere deconfliction.

The question is no longer whether Iran can close the strait, but whether it can afford the isolation that would follow.

Financial Times

Local voices, larger stakes

Fishermen in Bandar Abbas and Sur speak of dwindling catches and the constant shadow of naval manoeuvres. For them, any agreement that reduces the risk of miscalculation is welcome. Yet many Iranians and Omanis alike worry that formalising Iranian presence could embolden hardliners in Tehran. Conversely, Gulf Arab analysts fear that legitimising Iran’s role may erode the legal basis for international naval missions that have escorted tankers since the 1980s “Tanker War.”

The disagreement in diplomatic rooms is stark: Washington and its partners insist that freedom of navigation is a global concern best guaranteed by collective naval presence; Iran and Oman counter that the states bordering the strait possess both the primary interest and the legitimacy to manage it. History suggests neither claim is absolute. The 1970s bilateral agreements between Iran and Oman on the strait’s median line were quietly effective until regional politics overtook them. A new understanding may revive that spirit, provided it is not sold as victory for one side.

What remains unsettled is whether a bilateral Hormuz pact can survive the next regional shock: an Israeli strike on Iranian facilities, renewed US “maximum pressure,” or an internal succession crisis in either capital. For now, the talks themselves are the story. In a region where grand multilateral initiatives routinely collapse, the modest prospect of two littoral states agreeing on practical cooperation is noteworthy. It will not solve the Persian Gulf’s deeper rivalries, but it may prevent their worst expression at the narrowest point on the map.